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Abstract
We argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important eco-
nomic consequences. In a model where the costs of earnings management are endoge-
nous, we show that in equilibrium, low productivity firms hire and invest too much
in order to pool with high productivity firms. This behavior distorts the allocation of
economic resources in the economy. We test the predictions of the model using firm-
level data. We show that during periods of suspicious accounting, firms hire and invest
excessively, while managers exercise options. When the misreporting is detected, firms
shed labor and capital and productivity improves. Our firm-level results hold both be-
fore and after the market crash of 2000. In the aggregate, our model provides a novel
explanation for periods of jobless and investment-less growth.
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Introduction
Fraudulent accounting by management has been costly for shareholders. The market ad-
justed return over the three-days surrounding the announcement of a restatement to finan-
cial statements is associated with an average return of —10% (see GAO (2002)). Though
the losses to shareholders are large and apparent, the impact of fraudulent accounting on
the wider economy is not well understood. It is not well known, for instance, whether
earnings management lowers economic efficiency or whether it simply redistributes income
from shareholders to insiders. In this paper, we examine the potential economic conse-
quences of fraudulent accounting, with a particular focus on the dynamics of employment
and investment.
The dramatic case of Enron’s restatement illustrates this effect. On November 8, 2001,
Enron announced that it would restate its earnings for the period 1997 through 2001. This
restatement recorded a $1.2 billion reduction to shareholders equity. The stock price of
Enron declined from more than $30 to less than $1 between October 16, 2001 and November
28, 2001. Accompanying these large losses was a dramatic pattern of growth and demise.
During the period when Enron was misreporting, it grew faster than any other firm in
the industry. The book value of Enron’s assets nearly tripled, from $23.5 billion in 1997
to $65.5 billion in 2000. Tobin’s Q increased from 1.32 to 1.8 over this period. At its
peak, Enron employed more than 20,000 employees worldwide. This period of misreporting
was also characterized by substantial stock sales by Enron insiders see Figure 1). After
its restatement Enron shrank rapidly. Today, about 500 employees remain and Enron’s
creditors expect to receive about one-fifth of the estimated $63 billion they are owed.
In this paper, we report that Enron’s story is typical — if somewhat extreme — of the
dynamic of employment and investment around periods of fraudulent accounting. We also
show that the joint dynamics of misreporting, insider’s trades, employment and investment
can be explained by a simple model of multi-dimensional signaling.
We study the problem of managers who privately observe the true productivity of their
companies, and who make hiring and investment decisions. Managers who want to hide the
low productivity of their firms must not only manage earnings, but also hire and invest as
if productivity was high. It would not be sufficient to merely misreport performance. In
equilibrium, firms with low true productivity hire and invest excessively, distorting the al-
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location of resources in the economy. Prior and concurrent theoretical work (see Narayanan
(1985), Stein (1989), Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2004), Goldman and Slezak (2003) and
Povel, Singh, and Winton (2004)) has not emphasized these implications. In our model,
real costs of manipulation arise endogenously because earnings management distorts the
hiring and investment decisions of firms.
In our model, managers want to report high profits because of the opportunity to engage
in insider trading. Managers do not have a direct preference for investing, but the require-
ments of signalling compels them to act in a consistent manner. The essential point that
emerges is a general one: in any signaling equilibrium hiring and investment must be con-
sistent with reported profits. In alternative interpretations, such as managerial optimism
or empire building, managers might have a primary desire for hiring and investment, but
it is the same requirement of consistency that lead them to manipulate earnings. In both
cases, earnings manipulation is a necessary condition for overinvestment.
We use a sample of firms that restate their earnings between January 1997 and June
2002 to test the predictions of our model. We first look at insider trading. In the model,
earnings management boost stock prices, allowing managers to make profitable trades, and
managers with larger stock and option holdings are more likely to engage in earnings man-
agement. Recently, Beneish and Vargus (2002), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns
and Kedia (2004), Bartov and Mohanram (2004) and Roulstone (2005) have confirmed these
predictions. Similarly, our data shows that, during the misreported period, CEOs exercise a
significantly higher fraction of their exercisable options than the CEOs of comparable firms.
We then focus on the dynamics of employment and investment. We find that, during the
periods when they misreport, firms hire and invest more than comparable firms matched
on age, industry and initial size. Hiring and investment are significantly lower after the
restated period. The use of a control group ensures that our results are not explained by
industry-age-size specific exogenous factors. In other words, the results do not simply reflect
a bubble affecting young firms in the computer industry. Our results continue to hold if we
restrict our sample to the restatements announced before the market crash of 2000 and also
hold in industries with below median growth rates. It is therefore unlikely that earnings
management is simply a side effect of exogenous over valuation.
When testing for the implications of the model, the question is not whether earnings
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management causes overinvestment (in our model, both earnings management and overin-
vestment are caused by disappointing true productivity) but rather whether overinvestment
would have been possible if firms had reported the true numbers. In other words: would
Enron have been able to hire and invest the way it did if Enron had published its true
profit numbers? Our results suggest that the answer is no, for two sets of reasons. First,
our empirical results clearly indicate that overinvestment is not random, but mimics the
investment of firms with similar market value growth prior to the misreporting. Also, the
distortions in investment and hiring are related to the extent of manipulation. This validates
our main theoretical point about the requirement for consistency, and documents for the
first time that misreporting is accompanied by distortions in the firm’s hiring and invest-
ment. Second, if earnings management was not necessary, why did managers engage in it at
significant personal costs? Clearly, they must have believed that showing high profits was
required. Moreover, market value drops by more than 10% on average when restatements
are announced (GAO (2002)). Had managers published the true numbers, the market value
of their companies would have been substantially lower, which would have made it much
harder for them to hire and invest a lot.
In their review of the earnings management literature, Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue
that “prior research has focused almost exclusively on understanding whether earnings
management exists and why.” They also point to a crucial question that the academic
research has left unanswered: What is the effect of earnings management on the allocation of
resources? Our paper addresses this issue and is the first to show that earnings management
can explain periods of jobless and investment-less growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 presents our
firm level data. Section 3 briefly considers insider trading. Section 4 examines the dynamics
of employment and investment for fraudulent firms. It contains various subsections with
robustness checks and a discussion of alternative interpretations of our results. Section 5
focuses on the dynamics of non-restating firms. Section 6 concludes.
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1 Model
We now present a model of earnings manipulation. We show that real inefficiencies arise
from the interaction of endogenous hiring and investment decisions with the opportunity
to manipulate earnings.
1.1 Description of the Model
Technology
The model has two periods, t = 1, 2, and a large number of firms whose true profits xt depend
on their true productivity θ and on the amount of labor they hire nt. The productivity θ
is the same in the two periods. For simplicity, we use a Leontief production function and
we assume that labor is the only factor of production, supplied at price w < 1. Profits are
given by
xt = min (nt, θ)− wnt .
Half of the firms have a low productivity θ = θL, and half of the firms have a high produc-
tivity, θ = θH , with θH > θL > 0.1. The first best level of employment is simply n∗ (θ) = θ
and the first best true profits are
x∗ (θ) = θ (1−w) .
Information
To study earnings manipulation, we assume that the true productivity of the firm is ob-
served only by the manager, and that reported profits can be manipulated. More precisely,
investors observe only employment nt and reported profits yt, which are equal to true profits
plus discretionary accruals, at. The investors cannot observe θ nor xt directly. The risk free
rate is normalized to 0, and accruals always have a zero net present value. Hence,
y1 = x1 + a ,
y2 = x2 − a .
1The Leontief technology makes the formula easier to read, but the results generalize to any production
function that is super-modular in (n, θ). An example is when managers influence the productivity of their
companies and output is y = θf (n) for some increasing function f (.). A case that would not deliver the
same result is y = θ+ f (n) because it makes optimal employment independent of the type of the manager.
The evidence supports the super-modular case, since for instance, managers of large companies are paid
more than managers of small companies.
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Trading and Punishment for Manipulation
Each firm has one share, and all earnings are paid out as dividends. Hence, each stock
holder receives yt in period t. Managers know x, and they own α ∈ (0, 1) shares that they
must sell at the end of the first period. If they manage their earnings, managers are caught
and punished with some probability. Let γ be the expected punishment. In section 1.3, we
extend the model to allow for endogenous trading. Goldman and Slezak (2003) show how
to endogenize α in a model with unobserved managerial effort.
1.2 Equilibrium
In our model, the managers privately observe the productivity of their company. For half of
them, the news is good, while the other half discovers a low productivity and can be tempted
to hide it by managing earnings. Let λ be the fraction of managers of unproductive firms
who manipulate (strategy m) and 1 − λ the fraction who report honestly. Let λˆ be the
market belief about λ. Let us assume for now that the managers of productive firms report
honestly. We will return to this issue below. Since n is observable, firms who manipulate
must hire just like good ones, therefore
nm = θH ,
and the associated true profits are
xm = θL − θHw .
Note that xm < x∗L because of the excessive hiring. Discretionary accruals have to make up
not only for the fundamental difference in quality x∗H − x∗L =
¡
θH − θL
¢
(1− w), but also
for the inefficient allocation of resources x∗L − xm =
¡
θH − θL
¢
w. Thus,
a = x∗H − xm = θH − θL .
Assuming efficient financial markets, the market value of the firm, as a function of its current
earnings, is
V
³
y1, λˆ
´
= E
h
y2 | y1, λˆ
i
=
(
VL = x∗
¡
θL
¢
if y1 < x∗L
VH
³
λˆ
´
if y1 ≥ x∗H
)
, (1)
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where
VH
³
λˆ
´
=
x∗H + λˆx
∗
L
1 + λˆ
− λˆ
1 + λˆ
a .
The expected utilities of managers of unproductive firms under strategies o and m are
U∗ = αVL ; U
m = αVH
³
λˆ
´
− γ .
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a market belief λˆ such that managers choose max (U∗, Um)
and λ = λˆ.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium where the managers of productive firms
report truthfully. This equilibrium is partially pooling. The fraction λˆ of managers of unpro-
ductive firms who manipulate increases with the number of shares owned by the managers
α, with the difference between productive and unproductive firms θH − θL, and it decreases
with the cost of manipulation γ.
Proof. The equilibrium condition for 0 < λ < 1 is
U∗ = Um ⇔ VH
³
λˆ
´
= VL +
γ
α
,
which leads to
1 + λˆ
1− w − λˆ
=
α
γ
¡
θH − θL
¢
. (2)
This shows that λˆ is unique, and is increasing in α and in θH − θL and decreasing in γ.
Note that this implies that λ = 1 is not an equilibrium. On the other hand λ = 0 is an
equilibrium if γ > α (1− w)
¡
θH − θL
¢
, because the punishment are strong enough to deter
manipulation. Finally, it is clear from (1) that managers of productive firms strictly prefer
to report truthfully.
1.3 Discussion of the Model
In this section, we discuss three issues: the existence of separating equilibria, the impact of
endogenous insider trading, and the revelation of information over time. We conclude by
presenting the predictions of the model that we are going to test empirically.
Separating equilibria
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In the previous section, we have considered only those equilibria in which productive man-
agers report truthfully. With the assumptions that we have made, there are no other
equilibria. We know from game theory that separation can happen if there exists an ob-
servable action which is relatively more costly for the mimicking type than for the mimicked
type, as in Spence (1974). But in our setup, it is not possible for the productive managers
to separate because the punishment function γ is a step function: the expected punishment
does not increase with the size of the manipulation. Hence, it is not more costly for the
unproductive type to report any y1 ≥ x∗H than it would be for the productive type. This
result relies on the assumptions that we have made, since we know that in general, the set
of equilibria in general depends on the details of the information structure,2 and on the
functional form for the punishment technology γ.3 However, one clear result in the empiri-
cal literature on earnings management is that stock prices react strongly to announcements
of earnings restatements. Therefore, pooling does occur in the real world. Let us emphasize
here that we do not pretend to show theoretically that pooling is likely to occur, but rather,
that we focus on pooling equilibria because they seem to be empirically relevant.
Endogenous trading
Another important assumption we have made is that managers are exogenously required to
sell their stocks. Obviously, the managers of productive firms would like to wait until all
uncertainty is resolved to avoid selling their shares at a discount. It is straightforward to
extend the model to allow for endogenous trading. Suppose that a fraction δ of managers
are hit by liquidity shocks and have to trade. The remaining managers decide to trade or
not, based on their private information. Managers who are not hit by a liquidity shock
consume at the end of period 2. It is easy to see that managers of productive firms do
not trade unless they have to, and that managers who have manipulated always trade.
Productive managers are better off waiting since they would have to sell below the market
price. Unproductive managers who manipulated their earnings at t = 1 are better off
trading since their manipulation will be found out at time t = 2. Therefore, the value of
2See Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2004)
3 It is possible to construct equilibria where good managers separate from bad managers if the probability
of detection increases quickly enough with the amount of manipulation.
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the firm conditional on reporting high profits and trading at date 1, is
VH
³
λˆ, trade
´
=
δx∗H + λˆx
∗
L
δ + λˆ
− λˆ
δ + λˆ
a ,
while VH (notrade) = x∗H . The equilibrium condition VH
³
λˆ, trade
´
= VL +
γ
α leads to
δ + λˆ
(1− w) δ − λˆ
=
α
γ
¡
θH − θL
¢
. (3)
Comparing this equation to equation (2) in section 1.2, we see that endogenous trading
reduces the incentives to manipulate because of the price impact. In particular, the equilib-
rium level of manipulation always satisfies λˆ < (1− w) δ, so manipulation must disappear
when δ goes to zero. Like in the noise trading literature, a higher δ induces more insider
trading by decreasing the price impact. In mapping the model to the data, it is important
to keep in mind that in reality, there is no final period where the true value of the firm is
perfectly revealed. It is clear that managers must liquidate their positions at some point
during their lifetime, and as long as some uncertainty remains, our qualitative results will
continue to hold.
Multiple periods
Finally, there is the issue of what would happen in a multiperiod framework. With an
infinite horizon, our model would become equivalent to a Ponzi scheme. The stock of
accruals would grow over time as managers continuously borrow against the future in order
to keep posting high earnings. We have assumed that managers use accruals to manipulate
the perceived value of their firm, but accruals are clearly not the only way to do so (see
for instance Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006)). However, irrespective of the technical
details, it is clear that the manipulation, while likely to be effective in the short-run, cannot
go on forever. This intuition is supported in the data: earnings are typically restated 7
quarters after the beginning of the suspicious period.
Empirical predictions
In the remaining of the paper, we use firm level data to test the empirical predictions of the
model. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Burns and Kedia (2004), among others, have
already confirmed the comparative statics with respect to α. The straightforward extension
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of our model to endogenous trading, discussed above, is consistent with the evidence in
Roulstone (2005), that insider purchases are higher before the release of good news, and
lower before the release of bad news. In the empirical analysis below, we confirm these prior
results by showing higher exercises during periods when earnings are being manipulated.
The other empirical predictions of our model that have not been tested in the literature are
summarized below:
1. Firms managing earnings hire and invest more than predicted by their technology.
Hence, one would expect to see these firms shrink after they are exposed.
2. As firms manage earnings to be valued like successful firms, the excessive hiring and
investment is not random but consistent with that of mimicked successful firms.
3. The magnitude of earning manipulations should be related to the observed distortions
in hiring and investment.
4. Earning manipulation decreases with γ, the expected costs of manipulation.4
We first describe the data. Next, we briefly discuss insider trading, an area where much
work has already been done. We then turn to the dynamics of hiring and investment, that
we are the first to investigate. We then explore the other empirical implications of the
model before concluding with a discussion of alternate explanations for our findings.
2 Data
To capture alleged fraudulent accounting, we use the list of firms that restated their earnings
in the late 1990s. This list was compiled by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 2002
(GAO (2002)). The GAO “identified 919 financial restatements by 845 public companies
from January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002, that involved accounting irregularities resulting
in material misstatements of financial results.” These financial restatements occur when a
company, either voluntarily or prompted by its auditors or regulators, revises public finan-
cial information that was previously reported.5 Six-hundred-forty-five of these companies
4Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) provide evidence on the impact of potential legal liability costs on insider
trading decisions.
5These announcements exclude stock splits, changes in accounting principles, and other restatements that
were not made to correct mistakes in the application of accounting standards.
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were publicly traded. The distribution of announcements per year shows a clear upward
trend (see Table 1). The number of identified restatements rose from 92 in 1997 to 225
in 2001. “The proportion of listed companies on NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ identified as
restating their financial reports tripled from 0.89% in 1997 to 2.5% in 2001. From Jan-
uary 1997 through June 2002, about 10% of all listed companies announced at least one
restatement.”(GAO (2002)). Moreover, later restatements involved larger firms: the average
market capitalization of restating companies quadrupled between 1997 and 2002, from $500
million to $4 billion, while the average size of listed companies increased only about 60%
over the same period.
The GAO also reports the reasons for the restatements. Errors in revenue recognitions
account for roughly 40% of the cases while those due to improper cost accounting explain
16%. Issues with loans, like write-offs, reserves, and bad loans account for 14% of the cases.
Issues with assets and inventories, like goodwill, write downs, and valuation account for
another 9% of restatements. The remaining 20% of cases are linked to R&D, M&A, securities
(Enron for instance), reclassifications of debt payments and related party transactions. Only
16% of the restatements can be formally attributed to external parties’ actions like the
SEC or independent auditors. Further, many firms do not mention in their reports the
real reason for their restatements, unless they are somehow forced to do so (see GAO for
details). Restatements are not fully anticipated by the market; the market-adjusted return
over the three trading days surrounding the initial announcement is -10%. For the 575
restatements for which six months of data were available around the announcement, the six
month abnormal holding period return was -18%.
We match the GAO data to COMPUSTAT through company name. Out of the 645
publicly traded companies, 560 firms were covered by COMPUSTAT. For 539 firms, we were
able to obtain the beginning and end dates of the restated period, in addition to the date
on which the restatement was announced. The restated period or the fraudulent period is
the period for which the financial data was eventually restated. This restated period, over
which the fraud was allegedly committed, lasts for an average of five quarters (see Table 1).
It takes an average of two quarters from the end of the restated period to the announcement
of the restatement. We also collected data on the size of the restatement.6 We were able
6Size of restatement is the average annual impact of the restatement on net income.
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to obtain this information for 396 firms. The average ratio of restated earnings over lagged
sales is -6% and 80% of the restatements are negative, i.e., involve negative revisions to
reported net income. This variable is winsorized so that the maximum is no more than +1
and the minimum no less than -1.
Table 1 also displays the summary statistics for the other variables of interest. The
growth rates reported are the 1-year log differences and have been winsorized so that the
maximum is no more than +1 and the minimum no less than -1. To capture hiring decisions
we calculate the growth rate of the number of employees (COMPUSTAT Data Item 29),
which, for non-restating COMPUSTAT firms over the period 1991 to 2003, was 4%. To
capture investment decisions, we look at the growth rate of property plant and equipment
(COMPUSTAT Data Item 8). The average growth in property, plant, and equipment for
non-restating COMPUSTAT firms was 7% per year. The second measure of investment
activity that we examine is the ratio of capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT Data Item 30)
to property plant and equipment. According to these three measures, restating firms grew
slightly faster that non-restating firms over the whole sample, but the differences are very
small relative to the standard deviations of these variables.
The unconditional dynamics of restating and non-restating firms are also remarkably
similar with respect to the growth rate of market values and sales. We use sales per employee
to measure labor productivity. The growth rate of sales per employee is 5% for both restating
and non-restating firms. We also compute a measure of total factor productivity growth
(henceforth, TFP) by estimating the shares of labor and capital for each industry, at the two
digit SIC level.7 To capture insider trading activity, we get data on CEO option exercises
from EXECUCOMP. Option exercises are captured by the ratio of the value realized from
option exercises normalized by the total value realizable from options. The total value
7Sales are deflated using the GDP deflator, while PP&E are deflated using the non-residential investment
deflator. For firm i in industry j at time t, with deflated sales sit, number of employees nit and deflated
PP&E kit, we define the growth of TFP as
dTFP = d log sit − αjd lognit − (1− αj) d log kit ,
where αj is the industry-mean ratio of compensation of employees over operating income + compensation
of employees. Needless to say, there are issues with measuring productivity in COMPUSTAT. We do not
have firm specific price deflators and we do not have good measures of inventories or intermediate inputs.
Nonetheless, when we average across the firms in the sample, we find that this measure yields a good estimate
of aggregate TFP growth computed from the NIPA. In the rest of the paper, we will always report the
results for both TFP and labor productivity (deflated sales per employee).
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realizable from options is the sum of the value realized from option exercises and the value
of exercisable options. We find no difference in the unconditional value of this ratio between
restating and non-restating firms. Overall, Table 1 shows that the unconditional dynamics
of restating and non-restating firms are quite similar. We show below that the conditional
dynamics are remarkably different.
3 Insider Trading
Since there already exists a large literature on earnings management and insider trading
(see for instance Bartov and Mohanram (2004) or Roulstone (2005)), and since our main
focus is on the investment-employment dynamics, we examine only briefly the prediction
that insider trading is higher during the restated period.
Data on option exercises of CEOs is obtained from EXECUCOMP. Our sample consist
of all the firms in EXECUCOMP with non-missing value for the variables of interest and
with at least one year of data in the before, during and after period. We estimate
yit = β
before1t<τ(i) + β
during1t∈τ(i) + β
after1t>τ(i) + φt + γxit−1 + uit .
In these regressions, yit is the ratio of the number of options exercised to total options
exercisable. We also examine the ratio of the value realized from option exercises over the
total value realizable from options and find the results are similar. τ (i) is the restated
period for firm i, and τ (i) = ∅ for firms that do not restate. The RHS variables include
time dummies φt as well as some control variables xi,t−1. We control for industry patterns
by including average option exercises for all firms in the same two-digit SIC with data on
EXECUCOMP for that year. We also control for the number of options outstanding, for
past stock performance and lagged Tobin’s Q..8 Table 2 shows that the βduring is positive
and significant implying that the CEOs of restating firms exercised relatively more options
than the CEOs of comparable firms in their industry during the period in which they were
misreporting. The magnitude of this effect is stable across these specifications, between 5%
and 6%. This is economically large given that the unconditional mean of y is 18% (seeTable
1). The higher exercises by CEOs during misreported periods relative to control firms, and
8Options outstanding control for the need to diversify firm risk. Executives with large option holdings
and large option grants are likely to have higher exercises. Ofek and Yermack (2000).
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relative to exercises in the prior period indicate that managerial optimism is unlikely to
explain the observed dynamic of employment and investment that is documented below.9
We now move on to the unexplored area of employment and investment dynamics.
4 Earnings Restatements and Firm Dynamics
4.1 Main Result
We want to compare the dynamics of hiring and investment for restating firms around the
restated period. We first create a control group of non-restating firms that are matched in
age, industry and initial size. For every restating firm, we choose all non-restating firms
that appear in COMPUSTAT in the same year as the restating firm, or in 1991 for the
firms already present at the beginning of our sample. We then select non-restating firms
that operate in the same industry (defined as two-digit SIC code), and that are in the same
initial book asset quintile. We exclude observations in government, health and education
sectors and firms which have less than three observations for asset and sales growth over
this time period. We adjust the variables of interest by subtracting the mean of this control
group.
gˆit = git − g¯C(i)t , (4)
where C (i) is the control group for firm i.
Figure 2 plots the mean adjusted growth rates, as in equation (4), for four key vari-
ables: total market value, number of employees, PP&E and TFP. All these variables are
constructed with the data as reported by the firm in real time, and do not include the effects
of the restatements. The horizontal axis measures time in years relative to the restated pe-
riod, which is time 0 by definition. Time +1 is one year after the end of the restated period,
and time -1 is one year before the beginning of the restated period. Note that the length of
the restated period varies across firms, so time 0 may include more than one year of data
for some firms. Also note that 97% of the restatements are announced either at time 0 or at
time 1. The figure shows that the market value of restating firms grew at a faster rate than
9These results are broadly consistent with the evidence in existing literature, though a recent paper by
Agrawal and Cooper (2006) find no evidence of abnormal equity sales in the misreported period. As we
model exercises at the executive level and control for his portofio holdings, rather than model exercises for
executives as a group, we are more likely to capture abnormal exercises.
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that of the control group before the restated period, at the same rate during the restated
period, and more slowly afterwards.
A similar picture emerges with respect to growth in PP&E and the number of employees.
On the other hand, productivity is flat. One must keep in mind, however, that the sales
were probably over-stated, so that true productivity probably increased.
We now turn to more formal econometric tests to substantiate this evidence. Consider
the econometric equation
gˆit = β
before1τ(i)−2≤t<τ(i) + β
during1t∈τ(i) + β
after1τ(i)<t≤τ(i)+2 + uit , (5)
where τ (i) is the restated period for firm i. A positive estimated coefficient βduring implies
that the restating firms grew faster than comparable firms in their industry during the
period in which they were misreporting. The coefficients βbefore and βafter show if they grew
differently before and after the suspicious period. In these comparisons, the null hypothesis
is that β = 0. We can also compare β over time to see if the dynamics of restating firms
changed significantly around the restated period. In this case, the null hypothesis is that
βbefore = βduring, for instance.
The results are presented in Table 3.1. The growth of employment in fraudulent firms
is 4.1% higher during the fraudulent period. Consistent with prediction 1, we find that the
growth of employment is significantly lower after the restatement. A similar dynamic is seen
with investment activity. The growth rate of investment, i.e., PP&E is about 4.4% higher
during the restated period and 5.6% lower after the restated period. The same pattern is
seen when we examine capital expenditures normalized by PP&E. McNichols and Stubeen
(2006) also report similar higher investment during class periods by firms under litigation
for accounting manipulation. It appears that restating firms were growing rapidly in the
years prior to the restated period. These firms most likely misreported in order to continue
portraying themselves as high growth firms. This is reinforced by the dynamics of market
value. The growth in market value was 7.5% higher before the restatement and 6.7% lower
afterwards, and it was the same during the restated period, suggesting that the firms did
not surprise the market during this period.10
10A similar picture emerges when we examine analyst forecasts obtained from IBES for 408 restating
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The null hypothesis that βduring is the same as βafter can be rejected at less than 1%
level for all the variables except productivity. We can safely conclude that growth rates
of assets, employees, capital and market values were higher during the restated periods
than after, as predicted by the model. Interestingly, the growth rates of TFP and labor
productivity are not significantly different across firms and over time. As the period after
the restatement is not associated with lower productivity, it is unlikely that restatements
were the result of negative TFP shocks. Moreover, as the sales in the restated period were
inflated by fraudulent accounting for a large fraction of firms, the true productivity probably
increased after the restatement.
4.2 Subsample Analysis
Here we examine the robustness of our results in various subsamples.
We first ask whether our results are driven by the steep market decline in the Spring
of 2000.11 To do so, we estimate our econometric equation (5) on the sample of firms that
announced a restatement prior to the first quarter of 2000. As seen in the bottom half of
Table 3.1 we find similar results in this subsample. We conclude that our results are not
driven by the market crash of 2000.
We next split our sample according to industry growth rates before or after the restate-
ments. The industry growth rate is defined as the average growth in market value of firms
in that industry. The idea is similar in spirit to our first robustness check, but it is broader
in scope. Instead of asking whether our results are driven by a particular aggregate shock
(i.e. Spring 2000), we test the sensitivity of our results to business conditions in general.
There are two ways to split the sample: based on industry growth after the restatements
(Table 3.2), or based on industry growth before the restatements (Table 3.3).
In Table 3.2, we sort the restatements based on ex-post industry performance. This
allows us to ask whether our results are driven by restatements that take place in industries
experiencing large negative shocks. This test is closely linked to the one in table 3.1, but
it uses industry variation, and could therefore be more powerful. We find that our results
firms. For the two years prior to the restated period, in 62% of quarters restating firms beat analyst forecast
by an average of 18 cents. During the restated period, a similar fraction of quarters (59%) were associated
with exceeding analyst forecasts though the mean forecast error was only 6 cents. This is indicative of firms
managing earnings to just beat analyst forecasts and continue to portray themselves as growth firms.
11We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this analysis.
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hold in both subsamples. In fact, statistical significance is even higher when restatements
are not accompanied by negative industry shocks.
In Table 3.3, we sort the restatements based on industry performance in the two years
prior to misreporting. This test is different from the other two. Based on our model, we
would expect the results to be stronger in fast growing industries, since the incentives to
manipulate are stronger when P/E ratios are higher. Table 3.3 confirms this prediction.
The results continue to hold in industries with low growth rates, but they are stronger in
industries with high growth rates.
4.3 Mimicking strategy
Although the growth rate of employment and investment for misreporting firms is higher
than the average growth of age-size-industry matched control firms, it is not arbitrary. Pre-
diction 2 says that the earnings-employment-investment dynamics of restating firms should
be consistent with that observed in “mimicked” firms. To test this prediction, we select from
all the industry-age-size matched control firms those that also had similar growth in market
value (within 70% to 130% of the restating firm) in the years prior to the misreporting.
Table 4 shows that the growth rates of employment and investment of restating firms were
similar to those of mimicked firms in the years prior to, as well as, during the misreported
period. As the z-statistics indicate, it would not have been possible for an econometrician to
tell apart manipulating from mimicked firms prior to the announcements. Both mimicked
and manipulating firms grew faster than their industry averages by similar amounts along
all observable dimensions. As predicted by the requirement of consistency, the hiring and
overinvestment in misreported years is benchmarked to that of mimicked firms with similar
market value growth.
We now turn to the sub-sample of firms for which we were able to collect information on
the size of the restatement in order to test prediction 3. As we model the behavior of low
productivity firms misreporting to pool with high productivity firms, we restrict the sam-
ple to firms that announce income decreasing restatements. We investigate whether larger
restatements were associated with larger growth in employment and investment during the
misreported years and subsequent larger drops in employment and investment upon the
announcement of the restatement. Table 5 shows that this is indeed the case. Both the
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excessive employment and investment relative to control during periods of earning manage-
ment, as well as, the subsequent shrinkage of employment and investment upon discovery
is related to the magnitude of earnings management. On the other hand, we do not see
much effect of the magnitude of restatement on sales growth and productivity. This rela-
tionship between the magnitude of the earnings management and the degree of distortions
in employment and investment clearly indicate that the two are related, and that it is un-
likely that a similar dynamic of employment and investment could happen without earnings
manipulation.
4.4 Predicting Restatements: the Role of Governance
We now attempt to test prediction 4 that higher values of γ decrease the incidence of fraud.
It is difficult to find a quantitative measure of γ, the expected penalties from restating, let
alone one that is available for a large sample of firms. Presumably, managers of well governed
firms are more likely to be discovered in case of earnings manipulation. Thus, we would
expect these managers to face a higher γ. Recent work by Agrawal and Chadha (2005) finds
that board characteristics, especially the level of financial expertise of the audit committee,
affects the propensity to misreport. We complement their work by using another proxy of
good governance, proposed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). As good governance is
likely to increase γ, we would expect a negative relation between governance and earnings
manipulation. We test this prediction by running predictive logit regression in the cross-
section of firms present in our sample in 2002
P (restati,02) = F
¡
γ0Xi,96 + αI(i)
¢
,
where restati,02 is a dummy variable for any restatement by firm i between 1997 and 2002,
F (.) is the logistic function, αI(i) is a set of 2-digits industry dummies, and Xi,96 includes
age, assets and Tobin’s Q in 1996, as well as governance variables measured in 1995.12 The
governance variables come from the Institutional Investor Research Center (IRRC). IRRC
follows 24 governance provisions that appear beneficial to management, and which may be
harmful to shareholders. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) have used all 24 provisions to
construct an index of bad governance, and have shown that the index is negatively correlated
12The first year before the beginning of our sample where the data is available.
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with Tobin’s Q. Recently, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) have argued that staggered
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, super-majority requirements, poison pills
and golden parachutes account for most of the correlation.
In our data set, 770 firms have IRRC data available in 1995, and 99 of them restated.
Table 6 shows that firms with poor governance in 1995 were more likely to restate between
1997 and 2002 than comparable firms in the same industry. Among the individual provi-
sions, we find that classified boards are significant. Of course, we do not infer causality
from these reduced form regressions, as we cannot rule out omitted variable bias. It is pos-
sible that good firms, or honest managers, would be more likely to choose good governance
provisions, and at the same time would be less likely to commit frauds. Nonetheless, these
results show that there is information in the governance provisions studied by Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The timing of our regression also rules out the issue of reverse
causality to the extent that the sample of accounting problems examine here could not be
anticipated in 1995.
4.5 Alternate Interpretations
The empirical facts that we have documented are all consistent with the model of section
1. In this section, we will specify three alternate interpretations and discuss why they are
not consistent with the overall evidence.
First, one might argue that earnings restatement does not reflect genuine manipulations,
but rather excessive optimism by some managers. This view is inconsistent with the explicit
selection criteria of the GAO sample, that of including only those restatements that involve
accounting irregularities resulting in material misstatements. Nonetheless, for the sake of
the argument, let us assume that some managers are overly optimistic and that this leads
them to misstate their financial results. This might explain the relatively higher growth
rates before the restatement, and relatively lower growth rates afterwards. However, this
optimistic interpretation is inconsistent with the fact that managers exercise more options
during the misreported period.
Though the data shows that it is unlikely that managerial optimism explains the ob-
served hiring and investment dynamic, the presence of managerial optimism does not refute
our central point. Optimism generates a preference for hiring and investment, and con-
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sistency requirement for the signaling equilibrium creates a secondary demand for high
numbers and earnings manipulation. Even with managerial optimism, overinvestment and
hiring are accompanied by earnings manipulation, which is our basic point.
Second, one could argue that all firms are ex-ante identical, and that firms with negative
productivity shocks are forced to restate, while other firms with positive shocks do not.
We have shown, however, that measured productivity growth does not decrease following
the restatements. As the measured productivity during the misreported period is likely
overstated, true productivity probably increased after the restatement. Moreover, these
shocks are not randomly distributed among firms, since restating firms were growing faster
than their industry peers during the restated period, and since their managers were selling
more than the usual amount of shares.
Lastly, one might argue that exogenous over-valuation is responsible for the higher
growth of employment and investment and earnings manipulation merely a side effect of
this over-valuation. The issue here is not whether manipulating firms were over-valued, but
whether the same dynamics of investment and employment would have happened without
manipulation. Several reasons lead us to conclude that the dynamics would have been very
different if earnings manipulation had not been possible.
First, we match our restating firms to a control group of firms in the same industry, and
with similar characteristics. If the exogenous over-valuation is industry-age-size specific
it should also affect the control group and be irrelevant to us. For instance, our results
cannot be explained simply by a bubble affecting young firms in the computer industry.
As a similar hiring and investment dynamic is observed for restatements announced prior
to Spring 2000 and also in industries with below median growth rates, the results are not
driven by market level or industry level euphoria.
Second, if earnings management was not important, why should managers have engaged
in this activity at significant personal costs to them? The personal costs to the manager
in the form of reduced opportunities in the labor market are substantial as documented by
two recent papers (Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2005), Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2005)).
Clearly these managers believed that earnings manipulation was effective, otherwise they
would have abstained from it.
Third, we have quantitative evidence on the effect of the manipulation on the value of
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the firm. Event studies reported in GAO (2002) show that stock prices drop by an average
of 10% on the day that the restatement is announced. In other words, had the market
known before that the reported earnings were not correct, the valuation of the firm would
have been 10% lower, on average. This is exactly the number that we report in Figure
2: a negative 10% growth in market value over the year following the end of the restated
period.
We conclude that both market participants and managers believed that firm value was
significantly affected by earnings manipulation. This speaks directly to the link between
manipulation and the dynamics of firm value, and therefore investment and employment.
These dynamics would not have been the same if the firm had published the true numbers
throughout the period.
However, while manipulation is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one: unob-
served technology shocks are also necessary to create room for asymmetric information in
the first place. Our findings therefore support the following interpretation, which is simply
one way to rephrase the model of section 1. Some firms, previously successful, discover that
their potential growth has slowed down. To avoid, or at least to delay, the expected drop
in market value, the managers engage in earnings manipulations and continue hiring and
investing as before, while at the same time selling their stocks. It is a decline in growth op-
portunities that leads to earnings management, but it is earnings management that allows
the misallocation of resources.13
5 Aggregate Employment Growth
We now investigate the aggregate impact of earnings manipulations. The evidence presented
here goes beyond the predictions of the model of section 1, but it is relevant for two reasons:
first, to show that the mechanisms that we have emphasized do not wash in the aggregate,
and second, to stimulate future research.
13 In our setup, the manager is motivated by the desire to sell his stocks at a high price. Of course, one
could write a similar model where the manager is motivated by the desire to keep his job. The implications
would be similar.
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5.1 Restating Firms
A clear picture of the raw data can be obtained by looking at the dynamics of firms that
announced a restatement in 2000 (111 firms) and 2001(120 firms). The number of people
employed in these 231 restating firms over the period 1997 to 2002 is displayed in Figure 3.
The left panel of the figure compares the 231 restating firms to aggregate non-farm payrolls
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Employment in restating firms went
up by 0.5 million (+25%) between 1997 and 1999, and down by 0.6 million between 2000
and 2002. Over the same period, non-farm payrolls went up by 6.7% and then down by
1.5%. The relative increases and decreases in employment for restating firms are clearly
much larger than for the economy as a whole. A potential concern in this analysis is that
some firms drop out of the sample after the announcement of the restatement, sometimes
due to delisting, sometimes due to bankruptcy.
In the left panel, we implicitly assign zero employees to firms that drop out. For instance,
complete data for Enron is available only until 2000. To the extent that some firms drop
out of the sample, but, unlike Enron, continue operating, the left panel may overestimate
the true dynamics. To address this issue, we construct a constant sample of firms for which
we have complete data over this period. This constant sample comprises 74 firms that
restate in 2000 and 96 firms that restate in 2001. The right panel of Figure 3 compares
the employment in these restating firms to a constant sample of non-restating firms in
COMPUSTAT. Restating firms grew more rapidly than non-restating firms from 1997 to
1999 and declined much faster afterwards. The right panel also gives a sense of the coverage
of our data set: a bit less than a third of total non-farm payrolls.14 Clearly, the truth lies
somewhere in between the left panel and the right panel. If most restating firms are like
Enron, then the left panel is the better approximation. If most restating firms continue
operating with a reduced, but still significant, number of employees, then the right panel is
more appropriate.
14But a much larger share of output (more than 1/2), since only large firms with relatively high labor
productivity are included.
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5.2 Dynamics of Non Restating Firms
The dynamics of restating firms, that make them grow faster than comparable firms in the
restated period and slower afterwards, is also likely to impact other non-restating firms in
their industry. Some non-restating firms surely engaged in earnings management, but prob-
ably to a lesser extent than firms that eventually had to restate. In this case, our control
group is not valid and our results under-estimate the true impact of earnings management.
Moreover, investors may draw negative inferences about all firms that belong to an in-
dustry where many accounting frauds have been revealed, even if most of the firms were
actually honest. This suggests that the announcement of a restatement could have negative
implications for other, non-restating, firms in the industry. On the other hand, there are
equilibrium reasons to expect that non-restating firms might actually benefit from the an-
nouncements of restatements by their competitors. If they did not themselves manage their
earnings, and if investors do not become suspicious of them, non-restating firms should ex-
pand in response to the negative shocks affecting other firms in their industry. They should
try to steal market shares from the restating firms, and hire some of the laid-off workers.
We investigate the impact of restatements on non-restating firms by creating a panel of
industries at the 2-digit SIC level using only the non-restating firms.15 For each variable of
interest, we take the mean across non-restating firms in a particular year and industry as
our LHS variable, g¯jt. We then estimate
g¯jt = βR¯j,t + φt + φj + ujt , t = 1991..2003 , (6)
where R¯j,t is the fraction of firms in industry j that restated up to time t. We also include
year and industry dummies. We estimate this for all the relevant variables studied earlier.
The results are in Table 7. Non-restating firms grow more slowly when they belong to an
industry that had a lot of announced restatements in the preceding years. Interestingly,
sales per employee and TFP grow significantly faster following a wave of restatements.
In other words, fraudulent industries are characterized by high labor productivity growth
together with negative employment and investment growth, even for firms that did not
have to restate their earnings. The fact that sales per employee and TFP increase is not
15At least between January 1997 and June 2002. It is possible that some of these firms will restate after
June 2002.
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consistent with the interpretation of restatements simply as negative productivity shocks.
The potential impact of these industry dynamics on overall employment is large. To
get a sense of the magnitudes involved, we can obtain the predicted drop in employment by
multiplying the estimated β in the above regression with the average number of restating
firms R¯t across all industries. Figure 4 plots the employment growth predicted by the
evolution of the average R¯t, and compares it to the actual employment growth between 1995
and 2002. Note, however, that general equilibrium effects mean that our coefficient from
the cross-section of industries will over-estimate the true impact on aggregate employment
growth. The cross-sectional estimate is obtained for given factor prices (labor, capital,
intermediate inputs). In the aggregate, a drop in labor demand, for instance, would drive
down the wage, and mitigate the actual drop in employment.16
6 Conclusion
Earnings management is accompanied by distortions in the allocation of resources in the
economy. When hiring and investment decisions are observable, managers of firms with low
productivity not only manage earnings but also hire and invest too much in order to mimic
good managers. When they are caught and forced to restate, their firms shrink quickly.
We find strong support for these theoretical predictions in firm level data. Restating firms
grow at significantly higher rates during the periods where they misreport, relative to firms
matched on age, size, and industry. Growth in restating firms is significantly slower than
growth in matched firms in the years after the restatement.
In light of the overall evidence, we would argue that earnings manipulations can cause
an amplification of business cycles and a misallocation of resources. The publicly traded
firms that restated their earnings in 2000 and 2001 lost between 250,000 and 600,000 jobs
between 2000 and 2002. Some of these jobs would have been lost in any case, but earnings
management allowed the manipulating firms to grow faster than their peers in the years prior
to the restatements, thereby increasing the cyclical pattern. The misallocation is temporary
at the firm level, since it is not possible to conceal the true profitability of a business forever,
16Earnings management is a particular case of imperfect governance. Philippon (2004) studies imperfect
governance in a standard real business cycle model, calibrated to the US economy, and finds that imperfect
governance amplifies business cycle dynamics.
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but there is a permanent misallocation in the aggregate, since some firms are manipulating
in any given period. Moreover, we find that other, non-restating firms did not expand their
employment and investment to compensate for the losses of the restating firms. In fact,
in industries with a high incidence of restatements, non-restating firms also exhibit slow
growth in investment and employment, together with strong productivity growth.
The dynamics of hiring and investment in restating firms breaks the link between pro-
ductivity and factor demands. The period after the restatement is characterized by strong
productivity growth, while labor and capital demands fall. Earnings management can im-
pact aggregate dynamics through two opposing channels. On the one hand, the inefficient
allocation of resources among firms, created by earnings management, tends to reduce ag-
gregate activity. On the other hand, greater hiring and investment by misreporting firms
tend to increase aggregate activity. Thus, waves of earnings restatements can be followed by
periods of jobless growth and low investment. A full understanding of the macroeconomic
implications is a task for future research.
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Appendix
A A Brief Review of the Literature on Earnings Manage-
ment
In this section, we discuss previous research on earnings management, following Dechow,
Kothari, and Watts (1998). Economists write models about cash flows, but in practice,
investors look at earnings. Why? Because earnings forecast future cash flows. Consider a
firm, and assume that sales follow a random walk
st = st−1 + εt .
Earnings (assuming a constant profit rate π) are
et = πst ,
and we assume that accounts receivable (rect) and payable (payt) are constant fractions of
sales and total costs
rect = αst , and payt = β (1− π) st .
In this simplified setup, cash flows are simply given by
ct ≡ et +∆payt −∆rect
= πst + [β (1− π)− α] εt ,
so we see that
Et [ct+1] = πst = et .
To forecast future cash flows, and therefore to compute the value of the firm, we start with
earnings. The value of the firm at the end of period t is
Vt =
et
r
,
where r is the risk-adjusted discount rate. Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (1998) expand this
model to take into account other important features of accruals, such as depreciation, and
show that, empirically, accruals are indeed the better predictors of future cash flows (See
Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001)).
What we would like the reader to take away from this brief discussion is that earnings
forecast cash flows and that, to a first order, investors are right to focus on earnings when as-
sessing the value of a firm. The problem, however, is that earnings can be manipulated. For
instance, accruals, defined in our example as ∆rect −∆payt, cannot be verified. Investors
need to trust a manager who claims high earnings coming from large future receivables. Un-
fortunately, there are documented cases of earnings management. The evidence of earnings
management is manifest in the existence of restatements, as well as, shareholder litigation
based on the accusations of earnings management.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Value Realized / Exercisable Value 12393 0.18 0.29 0 1
Book Assets ($) 97560 3869 28938 0.20 1264032
Age (years) 97560 12.76 12.18 1 53
Market Value (growth rate) 79649 0.05 0.42 -1 1
Sales (growth rate) 97560 0.11 0.36 -1 1
Number of Employees (growth rate) 81133 0.04 0.30 -1 1
Prop. Plant & Equip. (growth rate) 92949 0.09 0.37 -1 1
Cap. Exp./ PPE 83625 0.32 0.30 -0.52 1
Total Factor Productivity (growth rate) 78445 0.04 0.30 -2 2
Sales per Employee (growth rate) 81133 0.05 0.32 -2 2
Value Realized / Exercisable Value 1358 0.18 0.29 0 1
Book Assets ($) 5565 3319 22319 0.25 705983
Age (years) 5565 14.62 13.82 1 53
Market Value (growth rate) 5039 0.06 0.44 -1 1
Sales (growth rate) 5565 0.12 0.35 -1 1
Number of Employees (growth rate) 5019 0.06 0.32 -1 1
Prop. Plant & Equip. (growth rate) 5397 0.10 0.39 -1 1
Cap. Exp./ PPE 5036 0.36 0.30 -0.08 1
Total Factor Productivity (growth rate) 4895 0.04 0.29 -2 1.83
Sales per Employee (growth rate) 5019 0.05 0.30 -2 2
Reported Length of Restated Period 
(quarters) 539 4.70 3.71 1 20
Delay between End of Restated Period 
and Announcement (quarters) 539 2.21 2.19 0 22
Restated Earnings over Lagged Sales 396 -0.06 0.20 -1 1
year Freq. Percent
1997 63 11.01
1998 65 11.36
1999 114 19.93
2000 123 21.50
2001 138 24.13
2002 69 12.06
Total 572 100
Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics
Note: Value Realized / Exercisable Value is (value realized from options exercised) / (value realized from options exercised + value of exercisable 
options) from EXECUCOMP. Age is current year minus first year the firm appears in COMPUSTAT. Sample period is 1991-2003.
Distribution of Restatement 
Announcements by Year
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Dependent Variable
Value Realized from Options 
Exercised over Value of 
Exercisable Options
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Before 0.0176 0.0175 0.0197 0.0166
1.19 1.18 1.36 0.91
During 0.0510 0.0503 0.0655 0.0669
2.08 2.05 2.72 2.19
After -0.0565 -0.0543 -0.0231 -0.0170
-2.26 -2.17 -0.94 -0.54
Average industry 
exercises 0.890 1.675 0.887
1.66 3.16 1.63
Options outstanding 0.002 0.003
3.33 3.46
Past year returns 0.0003 0.0003
4 3.05
Tobin Q 0.0324 0.0389
12.93 12.33
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.0413 0.03
N 6029 6029 5949 5949
Number of Options Exercised over Total Exercisable Options
The table displays the results from a tobit estimation of exercises by top executives. Before is a dummy for years preceding the restated 
period. During is a dummy for restated years. After is a dummy for years following the restated period. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. The sample period is 1991-2003. Restating firms were included if they had at data available for at least one year before, during and 
after misreporting.  The control is matched on two digit SIC and size. Coefficients are in bold; t-statistics are below the coefficients.
Table 2 : Insider Trading
0.075 0.069 0.059 0.058 0.043 0.004 0.009
5.46 6.51 5.3 4.76 4.26 0.44 1.06
-0.003 0.034 0.041 0.044 0.043 -0.007 -0.002
-0.2 2.86 3.48 3.33 4.11 -0.66 -0.24
-0.067 -0.045 -0.044 -0.056 -0.023 0.004 0.002
-5.48 -3.85 -4.41 -4.66 -2.66 0.44 0.2
R2 0.02 0.025 0.026 0.023 0.022 0 0
N 2745 2976 2656 2886 2669 2588 2656
Before=During 0.001 0.03 0.2 0.43 0.93 0.56 0.53
During=After 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.55 0.98
0.078 0.061 0.059 0.047 0.057 -0.008 -0.002
3.48 3.55 3.31 2.26 3.17 -0.65 -0.18
-0.006 0.027 0.042 0.053 0.069 -0.017 -0.008
-0.22 1.3 2.05 2.42 3.9 -1.09 -0.53
-0.143 -0.079 -0.065 -0.092 -0.04 0.004 -0.007
-7.17 -3.79 -3.79 -4.58 -2.62 0.26 -0.4
R2 0.048 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.039 0.001 0
N 1105 1215 1065 1190 1095 1048 1065
During=After 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 0 0.36 0.95
p-values
During
After
Complete Sample: 1991-2004
p-values
Pre Market Crash Sample: Restatements Announced Before Spring 2000
Before
After
Before
During
Table 3.1 : Adjusted Dynamics of Restating Firms
The dependent variables are relative to the mean of a control group, matched by size, age, and industry. Before and Afer are dummies for the 2-year periods 
before and after the restated period. During is a dummy for restated years. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are below the coefficients. Standard errors are 
robust and corrected for firm level clustering.
Growth of Market 
Value Growth of Sales
Growth of 
Employees
Dependent 
Variable Growth of TFPCap. Exp./ PPE
Growth of Sales 
per Employee
Growth of Prop. 
Plant & Equip.
0.082 0.078 0.077 0.07 0.054 0.002 0.005
3.72 5.02 4.93 4.16 3.86 0.22 0.45
0.002 0.029 0.04 0.041 0.043 -0.005 -0.001
0.09 1.58 2.35 2.15 2.87 -0.34 -0.08
-0.042 -0.034 -0.04 -0.056 -0.019 0.01 0.004
-2.46 -2.02 -2.78 -3.18 -1.56 0.79 0.3
R2 0.015 0.024 0.032 0.025 0.025 0.001 0
N 1366 1500 1374 1498 1472 1372 1374
During=After 0.1376 0.0077 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.48 0.81
0.071 0.054 0.038 0.039 0.029 0.002 0.01
4.17 3.74 2.33 2.21 1.89 0.19 0.76
-0.007 0.039 0.041 0.046 0.044 -0.008 -0.003
-0.38 2.46 2.56 2.55 2.94 -0.6 -0.26
-0.094 -0.058 -0.048 -0.055 -0.03 -0.003 0
-5.5 -3.61 -3.59 -3.57 -2.39 -0.22 -0.02
R2 0.033 0.027 0.021 0.019 0.02 0 0
N 1359 1451 1260 1363 1174 1194 1260
During=After 0.0013 0 0 0 0 0.80 0.88
p-values
During
After
Sample of Industries with Below Average Market Value Growth in the During/After Period
Sample of Industries with Above Average Market Value Growth in the During/After Period
Before
After
Before
During
p-values
Table 3.2 : Adjusted Dynamics of Restating Firms
The dependent variables are relative to the mean of a control group, matched by size, age, and industry. Before and Afer are dummies for the 2-year periods 
before and after the restated period. During is a dummy for restated years. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are below the coefficients. Standard errors are 
robust and corrected for firm level clustering.
Growth of Market 
Value Growth of Sales
Growth of 
Employees
Dependent 
Variable Growth of TFPCap. Exp./ PPE
Growth of Sales 
per Employee
Growth of Prop. 
Plant & Equip.
0.051 0.059 0.059 0.057 0.039 -0.004 -0.001
2.59 4.03 3.96 3.42 2.94 -0.39 -0.11
-0.01 0.003 0.024 0.043 0.035 -0.02 -0.01
-0.45 0.18 1.34 2.27 2.36 -1.47 -0.73
-0.056 -0.034 -0.036 -0.045 -0.02 0.006 0.004
-3.28 -2.18 -2.63 -2.83 -1.59 0.46 0.26
R2 0.011 0.017 0.021 0.02 0.017 0.002 0
N 1335 1445 1314 1433 1380 1302 1314
During=After 0.1327 0.1015 0.0055 0.0002 0.0009 0.22 0.53
0.1 0.079 0.059 0.058 0.049 0.013 0.02
5.27 5.19 3.52 3.31 3.08 1.03 1.64
-0.008 0.058 0.054 0.046 0.043 0.007 0.005
-0.4 3.52 3.3 2.45 2.83 0.5 0.35
-0.077 -0.039 -0.039 -0.059 -0.026 0.015 0.008
-4.36 -2.39 -2.66 -3.33 -1.95 1.19 0.68
R2 0.036 0.037 0.029 0.025 0.026 0.002 0.002
N 1298 1391 1219 1321 1169 1171 1219
During=After 0.0097 0 0 0 0 0.70 0.86
p-values
Table 3.3 : Adjusted Dynamics of Restating Firms
The dependent variables are relative to the mean of a control group, matched by size, age, and industry. Before and Afer are dummies for the 2-year 
periods before and after the restated period. During is a dummy for restated years. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are below the coefficients. Standard 
errors are robust and corrected for firm level clustering.
Growth of Market 
Value Growth of Sales
Growth of 
Employees
Dependent 
Variable Growth of TFPCap. Exp./ PPE
Growth of Sales 
per Employee
Growth of Prop. 
Plant & Equip.
During
After
Sample of Industries with Below Average Market Value Growth in the Before Period
Sample of Industries with Above Average Market Value Growth in the Before Period
Before
After
Before
During
p-values
 Market 
Value 
(growth rate)
Number of 
Employees 
(growth rate)
Prop. Plant 
& Equip. 
(growth rate)
Cap. Exp/  
PPE
Sales per 
employee 
(growth rate)
Market 
Value 
(growth rate)
Number of 
Employees 
(growth rate)
Prop. Plant 
& Equip. 
(growth rate)
Cap. Exp/  
PPE
Sales per 
employee 
(growth rate)
Mimicked Firms 0.2321 0.1127 0.1635 0.3185 0.0634 -0.023 0.0813 0.1323 0.2983 0.0419
Restating Firms 0.2413 0.1141 0.1713 0.3105 0.0488 -0.0878 0.0737 0.1247 0.306 0.0515
Z statistic 0.5878 0.2198 0.2657 0.4212 1.1706 1.9464 0.5027 0.3869 0.546 0.7653
N 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328
Pre Fraud Years Fraud Years
This table reports the median values for restating firms and mimicked firms.  The mimicked firms were matched on age-size-industry, as well as, on pre-fraud 
market value growth rate. The growth rate in market value of mimicked firms in the pre-fraud years was within 70-130% of the restating firm. The pre-fraud years 
include the five years prior to misreporting.  The Z-statistics tests for the difference in the medians of the two groups.
Table 4: Comparison of Restating and Mimicked Firms. 
Market Value 
(growth Rate)
Sales           
(growth rate)
Employees 
(growth rate)
Prop. Plant & 
Equip          
(growth rate)
Cap. Exp. / PPE   
(level)
Sales per 
Employee       
(growth rate)
Restated Earnings /Sales 0.1459 0.0582 0.0475 0.0075 0.048 0.0525
11.71 0.78 2.11 1.03 11.5 0.92
Constant -0.1081 0.0096 0.0386 0.0473 0.0185 -0.029
-2.65 0.37 1.7 1.76 1.46 -1.31
R2 0.0643 0.019 0.0232 0.0004 0.0783 0.0254
N 369 384 360 375 350 360
Restated Earnings /Sales -0.161 -0.062 -0.195 -0.287 -0.221 0.112
-2.08 -0.66 -2.33 -2.95 -3.55 1.28
Constant -0.055 -0.04 -0.028 -0.032 -0.015 -0.009
-3.74 -2.18 -1.72 -1.67 -1.15 -0.54
R2 0.013 0.001 0.016 0.025 0.039 0.005
N 337 349 338 340 315 338
Panel B:  Around Announcement of Restatement
Table 5: Adjusted Dynamics and Magnitude of Earnings Management
 The regressions use only restating firms and the dependent variables are relative to the mean of a control group, matched by size, age, and 
industry.  Restated earnings/ sales is the absolute value of the average magnitude of the restatement to sales for all income decreasing 
restatements.  For panel b, the growth rates are from end of year prior to the restatement announcement to end of year of the announcement.  
Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics re below the coefficients. 
Panel A:  During Misreporting Years
Independent Variables, 
all measured in 1998 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
0.267
2.95
0.158
3.45
0.616
2.33
0.437
1.74
0.886
1.51
0.298
1.26
0.535 0.555 0.474 0.452 0.447 0.44
1.99 2.07 1.79 1.73 1.71 1.68
0.272 0.246 0.263 0.245 0.245 0.259
2.9 2.58 2.8 2.71 2.68 2.81
0.334 0.297 0.405 0.416 0.428 0.381
0.61 0.52 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.71
N 770 770 770 770 770 770
Table 6 : Predicting Restatement using Corporate Governance
Bebchuck et al. index
Gompers et al. index
Log Age
Logit Models estimated in one cross-section in 2002 by pseudo maximum likelihood, with robust standard errors. 
Governance is measure in 1995 using IRRC, Q age and assets are measured in 1996, and restatements happen 
between 1997 and 2002. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are below the coefficients. Out of the 770 firms in the 
sample, 99 have a restatement.
Log Assets
Dependent Variable is Dummy for Restatement between 1997 and 2002.
Golden Parachute
Log Tobin's Q
Classified Board
Poison Pills
Limits to Amend 
Corporate Charter
ols ols ols ols ols ols ols
-0.394 -0.315 -0.467 -0.428 -0.167 0.202 0.232
-2.57 -3.07 -4.26 -3.72 -2.04 2.02 2.31
Year & Industry Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 796 796 796 796 796 796 796
R2 0.316 0.244 0.157 0.288 0.35 0.069 0.067
Average Number of 
Restatements in Industry 
in Previous Years
Market Value 
(growth rate) 
Sales (growth 
rate)
Number of 
Employees 
(growth rate)
TFP (growth 
rate)
Sales per 
Employee 
(growth rate)
Panel of industries created at the 2-digit SIC level from COMPUSTAT. Only firms that do not restate are included. Dependent variables are industry 
means. Sample period 1991-2003. Coefficients in bold, t-statistics below coefficients. All regressions include industry fixed effects and year fixed effects.
Table 7 : Industry Dynamics of Non-Restating Firms
Dependent Variable Cap. Exp./ PPE
Prop. Plant & 
Equip. (growth 
rate)
Figure 1: Insider Trading at Enron
Bars are shares sold, in millions on the left axis, line is average transaction price, in dollar on the right axis. Source: Thomson 
Financials.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of Firms Restating Earnings
Growth rates are relative to a control group of firms matched on size, age and industry.
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Figure 3: Employment Dynamics of Firms Announcing Restatements in 2000 or 2001
Number of employees, in millions.
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Figure 4: Employment Growth Predicted by Lagged Restatements
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